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26 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
SECRETARY OF WAR  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT  
ON NIA

Subject: Forthcoming Article in Life Magazine

In connection with the statement during the NIA meeting on 25 September 1946 about the forthcoming article in Life Magazine, the attached excerpts from this article, which will come out Friday, may be of interest.

*a/Hs✓*

MOY S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director of Central Intelligence

Incl.

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Note for record: Prepared by General Vandenberg.



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**EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE FOR LIFE MAGAZINE, 30 SEPTEMBER 1966**

**Title: Intelligence - Key to Defense**

**Caption under heading:** IN a confused world our diplomats need all the facts that they can get, but our present intelligence system is dangerously weak.  
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**By: William J. Donovan**

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We need an intelligence service with a skilled trained group of scholars and experts having the regional knowledge and the linguistic competence of the countries involved which should be the greatest aid in reaching the right solution at the right time. But have we got such an intelligence service now? No, we have not.

(Skip to another page.)

A year ago we broke up OSS. For peace time it was urged that OSS be replaced by another central intelligence service appropriate to our position as the world's greatest power and having at its organized fingertips all the information affecting the American position everywhere and anywhere. Instead there has emerged a makeshift intelligence service honoring in the breach every principle learned so painfully under fire. The new National Intelligence Authority is made up of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and of the Chief of Staff to the President. Thus we have a committee the first duty of whose members is to their respective departments. Intelligence is a full time job. How can we expect to get an efficient service based upon such an administrative fallacy?

Under this authority is the director who has the right to participate in the meetings of the committee, but not to vote. Although appointed by the President, he reports, not to him, but to the various heads of the departments to whom he furnishes the intelligence and upon whom he is dependent for facilities, funds and personnel. Can such a director be master in his own house? ~~How~~ will there be ~~any~~ initiative and imagination without which it will sink to mediocrity. The whole affair has been further weakened by placing the interpretive and evaluation unit in the State Department. Such machinery cannot possibly work. It cannot work because it violates all the precepts of intelligence which common sense and experience have handed down to us. What are these precepts?

1. \*\*\*\*\*
2. \*\*\*\*\*
3. \*\*\*\*\*
4. \*\*\*\*\*
5. \*\*\*\*\*

6. Administration. The director should be a civilian appointed by the President. This agency should have its own budget granted by Congress.

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(Last paragraph)

The consequences of Yalta will remain with us. To avoid such blunders in the future, our only hope is the kind of intelligence service we built at so heavy a cost--and junked.